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Investments in productive assets by broad-based black economic empowerment (BEE) 
enterprises in South Africa (SA) during the 1990s have been constrained, in part, by a 
lack of access to capital. Even if capital can be sourced, BEE businesses often face a 
liquidity problem, as conventional, equally amortized loan repayment plans do not 
take into account the size and timing of investment returns, or there are lags in the 
adjustment of management to such new investments. This paper describes five 
alternative loan  products to the conventional equally amortized loan: the single 
payment non-amortized loan; the decreasing payment loan; the partial payment loan; 
the graduated payment loan; and the deferred payment loan. Recent SA experience 
with the graduated payment loan and the deferred payment loan suggests that there is 
scope to alleviate the liquidity problem if a wholesaler of funds can offer such terms to 
private banks and venture capital investors who then on-lend to finance BEE asset 
investments that are otherwise considered relatively high credit risks. This would shift 
the liquidity problem away from the client to the wholesaler of the funds, but requires 
access to capital at favourable interest rates. Such capital could be sourced from 




Broad-based black economic empowerment (BEE) is a key policy objective in 
South Africa (SA) aimed at addressing the past lack of access to resources, like 
capital, by previously disadvantaged individuals (PDIs) (Mantu, 2003).  In 
2003, SA businessman Mr Nicholas Oppenheimer proposed that BEE could be 
promoted if companies that achieved higher levels of BEE (in equity 
ownership, human resource development and input procurement) were given 
the incentive of paying lower corporate tax rates (The Brenthurst Initiative, 
2003). This resembles the tax incentives available in the United States (US) 
since 1974 to businesses and employees that participated in Employee Stock 
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Ownership Plans (ESOPs) as a way to motivate employees to improve 
company profitability (SA Government, 2003). Lenders that financed 
companies in which ESOPs are the majority shareholders also qualified for tax 
benefits (DiMarzio et al, 2002:67). The SA government recognises that broad-
based BEE will require partnerships between the private and the public sector, 
with the latter providing funds to help finance the transfer of skills and asset 
ownership (Zille & Lyne, 2002). To this end, the Finance Minister Mr Trevor 
Manuel allocated R10 billion to the National Empowerment Fund (NEF) to 
support the funding of new ventures and business expansions that meet 
agreed empowerment criteria (Africapulse, 2003). These public funds could be 
profitably applied to programmes that leverage additional finance from the 
private sector for BEE firms.  
 
This raises the key question: what alternative loan products could be used to 
draw public and private funds into financing the purchase of productive assets 
(land, machinery, equipment etc.) by broad-based BEE projects so that more 
people benefit than only a limited number of shareholders who acquire 
ownership in established companies? Past development finance programmes 
in SA have charged relatively low nominal interest rates (sometimes negative 
in real terms) to encourage BEE (Coetzee, 1994). Low interest rates, however, 
discourage deposits, make it harder for banks to screen borrowers, encourage 
rent seeking, and reduce the sustainability of financial institutions (Adams, 
1987:12). While commercial banks are also unlikely to finance the purchase of 
equity by unskilled workers who are not creditworthy and lack collateral to 
secure loans (Krafft, 1996:213), they may be prepared to co-operate in public-
private efforts to develop and offer new loan products if there is the incentive 
that these products would finance productive assets to help empowered firms 
to grow.  
 
Conventional long-term loans in SA are repaid in a series of equal annual, 
semi-annual, quarterly or monthly payments that may not match the 
repayment capacity of BEE projects, particularly in the early years of 
operation. Profitable agribusiness investments often have relatively high 
development costs followed by a period of gradual growth in nominal cash 
flows (Barry et al, 1995). This creates a temporary liquidity problem in the 
early years, particularly when inflation is relatively high. Inflation raises 
current costs (the nominal interest rate exceeds the current rate of return to 
land or to other assets like machinery) and defers returns (nominal cash flows 
grow over time and improve repayment capacity) (Tweeten, 1989; Mueller & 
Hinton, 1975). Liquidity stress may also arise due to lags in adjustment by the 
managers of BEE firms to new asset investments. These lags may be caused by 
a lack of management experience and/or the need to develop new skills in 
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machinery, labour and marketing management (Barry et al, 1995:176). Naude 
(1998) identified a lack of business and administrative skills as the key issue 
affecting the performance of entrepreneurs in the small business sector in SA. 
In addition, Rogerson (1998; 1999) found that the lack of management, 
marketing skills and access to finance in the Free State and Mpumalanga 
provinces in SA constrained the development of small, medium and micro-
enterprises. Policymakers in SA thus need to find ways to encourage financiers 
to fund potentially creditworthy BEE projects using loan products that alleviate 
the liquidity problem and make the projects financially feasible in the long-term.  
 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine alternative loan products to the 
conventional equal payment (equally amortized) long-term loan in SA that 
lenders could offer to finance the growth of BEE firms faced with liquidity 
stress. The paper first reviews literature on the loan repayment problem under 
inflation, and outlines recent trends in inflation in SA. Section 3 then describes 
the repayment terms for conventional long-term loans, while section 4 
discusses five alternative loan products: the single payment non-amortized 
loan; the decreasing payment loan; the partial payment loan; the graduated 
payment loan; and the deferred payment loan. A loan principal of R200,000 
amortized over 20 years at a contractual nominal annual interest rate of 10% is 
used to compare the cash-flow effects of all of these loans. Section 5 discusses 
recent experiences in SA with some of these alternative loan  products in 
trying to promote broad-based BEE via investment in productive assets. 
Finally, a concluding section discusses some management and policy 
implications of the analysis.  
 
2.  THE LOAN REPAYMENT PROBLEM UNDER INFLATION 
 
Past studies in developing countries show that high nominal interest rates 
associated with inflation led to poor liquidity, which caused many (20 to 30% 
of) emerging agribusinesses to default on loans (Boakye-Dankwa, 1979:236). 
Lack of profitable technology, poor managerial ability, weather conditions, 
lack of records and collection procedures also contributed to the repayment 
problem. Inflation - an increase in the general level of prices for all goods and 
services in the economy - causes prices to increase with an equal decrease in 
the value of fixed money claims. Inflation is difficult to predict and thus 
uncertainty about inflation creates uncertainty over future prices (Baldwin & 
Ruback, 1986:657).  
 
Financial feasibility refers to the ability of an investment to satisfy the 
financing terms and performance criteria that are agreed upon by both the 
borrower and the lender (Barry et al, 1995:360). A profitable investment may 
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not always be financially feasible if the financing plan does not account for the 
size and timing of the investment’s returns, and the effects of capital gains. 
This problem occurs particularly in farmland investments due to the liquidity 
stress that arises when investors purchase farmland with debt finance. 
Farmland earns a real current return (rent), and nominal capital gains if 
nominal land values increase. Nieuwoudt (1987:10) reported that the average 
annual real current (cash) rate of return to land in the United Kingdom, US 
and SA is about 5% of its market value. Capital gains on land generate no cash 
flow for servicing debt unless that land is sold or used as collateral for 
refinancing (Melichar, 1979:1082).  
 
Lenders expect loan repayments to include both principal and interest that are 
paid in cash - of which part is a real return and part is the Fisherian “inflation 
premium” to reimburse lenders for any expected loss in purchasing power  
(Friedman, 1978:833). Given that borrowers only receive part of their return as 
cash, a financing gap occurs if they have considerable debt and the inflation 
rate is relatively high. Borrowers will not be able to make debt repayments 
from the cash that is generated from earnings in the early years after land 
purchase, and thus only after several years will the financing gap be reduced. 
This problem occurs with conventional long-term loans that are repaid in 
equal instalments (principal plus interest) that make no allowance for variable 
cash flows (Barry et al, 1995:361). If alternative loan financing methods could 
alleviate the cash-flow stress in the early years, then after several years, the 
combined effects of inflation in nominal returns, technology advances and 
improved managerial skills could increase cash flows and thus close the 
financing gap (Von Pishke, 1977, as cited in Boakye-Dankwa, 1979:249).  
 
Webb (1982:169) showed that borrowers in the US housing market 
experienced liquidity problems due to a combination of inflation and the 
terms of the traditional mortgage instruments. Cohn & Fischer, (cited in 
Vandell, 1978:1279), proposed that Alternative Mortgage Instruments (AMIs), 
with payments that can vary, could be a solution to these problems. The 
prospect of the widespread use of mortgages with variable repayments has not 
been met with universal enthusiasm (Webb, 1982; Colwell & Dehring, 1997). 
Lenders would be more reluctant to grant such mortgages to borrowers that are 
more prone to income fluctuations. Webb (1982:182) reported that a borrower 
with relatively higher income variations would be likely to have a potentially 
delinquent loan, whether or not the mortgage has highly variable payments. 
 
In SA, Mostert & Van Zyl (1989) found that droughts, high inflation and high 
nominal interest rates had severely reduced the liquidity of many farmers in 
the summer rainfall regions. They concluded that income injections without 
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obligations best alleviated the liquidity constraint, followed by interest-rate 
subsidies and debt standstill, for farmers faced with repaying medium- and 
long-term loans. Lyne et al (2000) compared the liquidity effects of cash grants 
and finite, diminishing interest-rate subsidies, and presented evidence from 
KwaZulu-Natal suggesting that cash grants have performed poorly in terms 
of helping to redistribute farmland to PDIs. This work supported Nieuwoudt 
and Vink’s (1995) finding that interest-rate subsidies that diminish at the 
expected rate of inflation can help to alleviate the cash-flow problem in the 
first few critical years after land purchase, while cash grants were less 
effective per rand of subsidy. 
 
2.1  Recent trends in inflation in South Africa 
 
The SA Reserve Bank conducts monetary policy within an inflation-targeting 
framework and the current target is for the average consumer price inflation 
rate less mortgage interest rates (CPIX) to be within the target range of 3 to 6% 
in 2002, 2003, and 2004 (Mboweni, 2002). According to Mboweni (2002), a 
number of factors show that SA could be close to the period when inflationary 
pressures could start to decrease, such as: a significant reduction in the rate of 
increase in the production prices of goods, which generally precedes changes 
in consumer price inflation; a strengthening in the external value of the rand 
since October 2002; slower growth in bank credit extension to households and 
firms; and ongoing fiscal discipline (considerable increases in revenue 
collections from taxes on income).  
 
During 2003, the Monetary Policy Committee in SA allowed the SA Reserve 
Bank to cut prime lending rates by 5.5 percentage points up to 12 November, 
lowering the current repo rate to 8% and prime overdraft lending rates to 
11.5% (Mboweni, 2003). While these developments should partly ease the 
liquidity problem that borrowers experience when using debt during periods 
of inflation, this problem still remains for those broad-based BEE projects that 
are more highly indebted, have lower initial annual cash flows, or experience 
management lags in bringing different types of new assets into full 
production. Section 3 shows why the conventional long-term loan with a 
series of equal repayments may not be appropriate to finance such projects. 
 
3.  CONVENTIONAL LOAN REPAYMENT TERMS  
 
3.1  Fixed (FRL) and variable rate (VRL) long-term loans 
Fixed rate long-term loans (FRLs) allow for equal total repayments each year, 
with a larger proportion of each succeeding payment representing principal 
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and a smaller portion comprising interest. The nominal contract interest rate is 
set at the time the loan is made and does not change over the life of the loan. 
The maturity term and size of the monthly payments on the loan are usually 
also fixed (Rose, 1989:481).  In SA, fixed and capped mortgage loans have been 
available since 1996, and can be set for a fixed term, usually six, 12 or 24 
months. The level at which interest rates are fixed varies from bank to bank, 
and depends on the period and size of the loan - most banks offer fixed rates 
up to 1.5 percentage points lower than the prime overdraft rate. Finance 
charges are levied against borrowers who decide to exit early from their FRL. 
By paying an interest premium the borrower can have the interest rate capped 
at a ceiling level, whilst still benefiting from any drop in the interest rate 
below the capped rate (ABSA Current Rates, 2003). Lending institutions in SA 
also offer VRLs that have mortgage interest rates that vary in line with 
changes in prime overdraft interest rates. Clients choosing VRLs can 
obviously benefit from expected reductions in interest rates, and vice versa. 
ABSA Bank also offers a facility whereby clients can fix the interest rates for a 
portion of their mortgage bonds, while leaving the balance at a variable rate 
(ABSA Current Rates, 2003). For illustration purposes, this paper will assume 
that, while the conventional loan is a VRL, it can be treated as a FRL for an 
assumed constant nominal annual interest rate level (10% in this case). 
An example of the FRL for a R200,000 loan at a nominal 10% annual interest 
rate over 20 years is given in Appendix 1, section 1.1. Following Barry et al 
(1995:619), equation (1) for the present value of a uniform series of payments 
(an annuity) was manipulated to calculate the total equal annual nominal loan 
repayment (A) by dividing the loan size (V0 = R200,000) by the annuity factor 
given in the square brackets, where i = the contractual nominal annual interest 
rate of 10%, and N = 20 years:  
 
V0 = A [ {1 – (1 + i) –N} ÷ i ]  (1) 
 
The interest portion of A was calculated by multiplying the loan balance after 
annual repayment by the nominal interest rate on the loan, while the principal 
portion was the difference between the total nominal payment and the interest 
payment in each specific year.  
 
The nominal annual payments (A = R23,492) are constant over the life of the 
loan. The annual principal payments increase, while the annual interest 
payments fall. Each year the loan balance diminishes, until year twenty when 
the loan has been fully amortized (Nelson et al, 1973:169). This FRL would 
require total nominal and real repayments of R469,838 and R319,263 
respectively, over the 20-year loan. Since the real burden of the nominal 
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annual payments declines over time with inflation, each successive payment 
over the 20-year loan period was adjusted to real terms assuming an expected 
annual inflation rate of 4%, in line with the November 2003 CPIX in SA 
(Mboweni, 2003). Following Gittinger (1982), the nominal A for each year was 
expressed in real terms by dividing it by the compounding inflation factor for 
that year. For example, the real value of A = R23,492 in Year 1 after an 
expected annual inflation rate of 4% is R22,588 (R23,492 ÷ 1.04), the real value 
of A = R23,492 in Year 2 is R21,720 (R23,492 ÷ (1.04)2) and so on.  This equal 
payment loan amortization plan may not be suitable for highly indebted BEE 
projects faced with the liquidity problem. Alternative loan products for such 
projects are considered in section 4.  
 
4.  ALTERNATIVE LOAN PRODUCTS 
 
The main problem with most conventional loan contracts is that the borrower 
is committed to fixed repayment schedules at a particular level of nominal 
interest rate, while net income may var y  w i d e l y  f r o m  y e a r  t o  y e a r .  S o m e  
borrowers may want to make pre-payments in high-income years, while those 
borrowers whose repayment ability is jeopardized by low yields or prices, or 
large unanticipated business expenses may have little choice but to default on 
debt repayments when a FRL is used (Lee et al, 1980:126). As noted in section 
2, loan contracts that allow for repayments to vary with incomes could be a 
solution to these repayment difficulties. The main advantage of such loans is 
their responsiveness to unexpected changes in market interest rates (Tucker, 
1976:427). Stansell and Millar (cited in Tucker, 1976:427) concluded that the 
variable rate, variable payment mortgage did not constitute an undue burden 
on the mortgagor. Rather the lender (bank) experiences the cash-flow 
problem, and thus its shareholders bear the cash-flow burden and are 
reluctant to offer these products.  In the US, variable payment loans are also 
usually interest rate-capped, which prevents the borrower from paying 
significantly higher interest rates than originally agreed upon during the loan 
term. Most rate caps increase or decrease by a maximum of two percentage 
points per year, and no more than six percentage points over the life of the loan. 
A payment cap on adjustable rate mortgages limits the amount by which the 
stream of constant nominal payments can increase (Kapoor et al, 1991:269). 
 
Edelstein (cited in Tucker, 1976:443) suggested that the ideal mortgage loan 
would be a combination of a fixed rate and non-standard mortgage, and he 
opted for a loan instrument that precisely corresponds to the proportion of 
income sources (including rents) that were nominally fixed and variable over 
time, respectively. By using a combination of different mortgage instruments, 
borrowers could diversify against any income-stream risk. While Edelstein 
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argued that the income of the typical mortgager will grow at least by the rate 
of inflation on average in the long-run, he felt that this was not true for all 
households that hold mortgages and thus the analysis of variable repayment 
plans needed to take into account possible distribution effects across each 
household, and income shocks. 
 
Alternative loan products that differ widely in the composition of their 
variable repayments include: the single payment non-amortized loan; the 
decreasing payment loan; the partial payment loan; the graduated payment 
loan; and the deferred payment loan.  
 
4.1  Single payment non-amortized loan (SPL)  
 
The SPL requires repayment of the entire loan principal at the end of the loan 
term. Traditionally, most farm mortgage loans in the US were five-year single 
payment loans. These loans required borrowers to pay interest each year, and 
then after five years, borrowers had the option to extend, renew, refinance or 
repay the loan. Loans were either renewed or refinanced for greater or smaller 
amounts depending on the losses or profits experienced in the past five years. 
As credit services increased in US agriculture, the five-year single payment 
loan was replaced by longer, more modified end-payment plans. These new 
loans included partial payment loans and they became particularly common 
in life insurance companies (Nelson et al, 1973:167). An example of a SPL is 
shown in Appendix 1, section 1.2. For a loan of R200,000 at a nominal annual 
interest rate of 10% over 20 years, the interest would be R20,000 each year 
until year twenty, when both the annual interest (R20,000) and the total 
principal (R200,000) are repaid. This SPL would require total nominal and real 
repayments of R600,000 and R363,084 respectively, over the 20-year loan (real 
payments calculated by the same method as the FRL).  
 
4.2  Decreasing payment loan (DP) 
 
The DP allows for a fixed annual principal payment and a declining interest 
payment on the outstanding principal balance. This repayment plan is easy to 
use and has a psychological advantage as the loan has a declining total annual 
payment which gives the borrower a definite sense of progress as each total 
payment is less than the previous one (Lee et al, 1980:124). An example of a DP 
is given in Appendix 1, section 1.3, where in year one the nominal annual 
principal is R10,000, while the nominal interest is R20,000. As the loan 
progresses, so the interest portion decreases from R20,000 in year one to 
R19,000 in year two, and the total annual repayment falls from R30,000 in year 
one to R29,000 in year two and so on, while the principal payment remains 
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fixed at R10,000 per year. This DP would require total nominal and real 
repayments of R410,000 and R296,145 respectively, over the 20 years (real 
payments again calculated by the same method as the FRL). While this is less 
costly overall than the 20-year FRL and SPL from the borrower’s perspective, 
it aggravates rather then alleviates the cash-flow problem for BEE investments 
in productive assets, as the total annual repayments are higher than for these 
loans over years one to seven and one to ten, respectively.  
 
4.3  Partial payment loan (PPL) 
 
The PPL (also known as a balloon payment loan) allows for small principal 
payments each year during the term of the loan, with the unpaid balance of 
the principal due as a lump sum or balloon payment at the end of the term. 
The balloon payment reflects the entire remaining balance of shorter-term 
loans (e.g. five years) that is amortized over the longer-term (10 to 20 years) 
(Barry et al, 1995:635). An example of the PPL is given in Appendix 1, section 
1.4 where the nominal principal and interest payments are calculated by the 
same method used for the FRL. The payments for years one to four are 
identical to a 20-year FRL, but in year five the outstanding principal of 
R183,794 plus an interest balance of R18,379 gives a total balloon payment of 
R202,173. This amount must either be refinanced at the current terms 
prevailing in year five, or paid up in full. If interest rates fall and credit 
conditions improve, a borrower could negotiate more favourable loan terms at 
renewal. If interest rates rise, the loan terms may become less favourable. This 
PPL would require total nominal and real repayments of R296,141 and 
R251,445 respectively, over five years. If balloon repayments are expected in 
year five, the PPL will worsen the liquidity problem facing BEE enterprises 
relative to a longer-term FRL. Alternatively, if the PPL terms allow interest rates 
to be assessed every five years over the 20-year period, then the financing terms 
of the PPL are similar to that of the 20-year VRL already offered by financing 
institutions in SA, and thus there would be no need to test this option. 
 
4.4  Graduated payment loan (GPL) 
 
The GPL was primarily developed for the US residential mortgage market in 
response to relatively high inflation rates in the US in the early 1970’s (Lee et 
al, 1980:127). Under the GPL, earlier payments are lower than if a FRL were 
used - the borrower’s initial nominal interest rate is stated as a percentage 
below the standard (i.e. market) rate. This percentage, or the interest rate 
differential, changes each year, so that the difference between the borrower 
rate and the standard rate gradually decreases. After a pre-determined period, 
the borrower will pay the standard rate, and thus the loan ultimately becomes 
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a conventional amortized loan (Introducing the Graduated Payment Plan, 
2003). In the US, the GPL repayments are structured so that the early 
repayments are lower than they would be on a corresponding FRL, but the 
later repayments (after the borrower’s annual incomes are expected to have 
risen by the annual expected inflation rate) are higher than they would be on a 
corresponding FRL. Lenders are indifferent between the FRL and this GPL 
from the point of view of the present value of the cash-inflows from these 
repayments (the respective initial principal amounts and future debt service 
amounts), but not from a risk perspective. The GPL has the same rate of 
return for the lender as the FRL, but a different default risk due to negative 
amortization – early nominal repayments may be so low that they do not 
cover interest payments, thus principal payments owed actually increase, 
rather than falling in the early stage of the loan (Colwell & Dehring, 1997). 
Due to such negative amortization, this type of loan can carry a higher down 
payment and higher interest rate to compensate lenders’ for the cash-flow 
problem that it paradoxically creates for them. 
 
To date, most GPLs in the US have been used for student loans as an incentive 
for graduates to bank with the issuing institutions in the future. More 
recently, GPLs were introduced in the US motor industry to help improve car 
sales. In SA, the Ithala Development Finance Corporation (Ithala) has used a 
GPL since 1996 that starts with a lower interest rate than would be charged on 
a conventional VRL to finance the purchase of medium-scale sugarcane farms 
by black commercial farmers. This was made possible as the sugar millers 
who sold these farms deposited 18 per cent of the purchase price with Ithala 
in order to finance an interest-rate subsidy (Mashatola & Darroch, 2003). Once 
the graduated nominal interest rate equals the market interest rate after about 
seven years, the loan becomes a conventional VRL. Some pros and cons of this 
scheme are discussed in more detail in section 5. If the GPL attracts subsidy, 
lenders would be less reluctant to finance a GPL than a VRL, even though the 
GPL has the added risk that the borrower’s repayment capacity may not 
increase in line with anticipated inflation (and, like the VRL, may be subject to 
unanticipated income shocks). 
 
An example of a 20-year loan of R200,000 that has 17 years of subsidised 
graduated payments (17YRGPL) is shown in Appendix 1, section 1.5, for a 
nominal annual interest rate of 10%. The borrower’s initial interest rate of 5% 
(corresponding to the assumed expected real current annual rate of return on 
land (Nieuwoudt, 1987)) gradually increases each year compared to the 
preceding year in line with a plausible expected annual inflation rate of 4%. 
The nominal interest rate paid, therefore, rises from 5% in year one, to 5.21% 
in year two and so on each year, until it equals 10% after 18 years. Since the 
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initial interest rate is five percentage points below the market interest rate of 
10%, the first year interest payment falls from R20,000 to R10,000 (a reduction 
of R10,000). This 17YRGPL requires total nominal and real repayments of 
R385,204 and R251,537 respectively, and a nominal interest subsidy of R84,634 
over 20 years (real payments again calculated by the same method as the 
FRL). Adding this interest subsidy of R84,634 to R385,204 gives the total 
nominal repayment of R469,838 required for the FRL.  
 
The six-year GPL (6YRGPL) in Appendix 1, section 1.5a shows that a higher 
initial borrower interest rate of 8% could be used on machinery-type assets 
that yield a higher real current annual rate of return than land is expected to 
generate (Mueller & Hinton, 1975). In this scenario the graduation period 
would only be for six years with a nominal interest rate subsidy of R13,957 
and total nominal and real repayments of R455,882 and R306,667 respectively. 
Again, adding the total nominal repayments and the nominal interest rate 
subsidy gives the R469,838 total nominal repayment for the FRL.   
 
4.5  Deferred payment loan (DEFPL)  
 
The DEFPL is an extreme form of the GPL where no principal or interest 
payments are made for a specified period of time. Deferred payments 
improve the borrower’s cash flow and allow for retained cash surpluses to 
supplement dividends in future years when reinvestment is expected to 
reduce liquidity. Different projects might require longer periods of deferment 
to overcome cash-flow problems (Graham & Lyne, 1999). The trade-off from 
having a longer deferment period is that future profits from BEE investments 
in productive assets will decline. Projects that might not have been approved 
thus become feasible, but at the expense of a lower net present value of future 
income streams to the borrower (Zille & Lyne, 2002). If lenders offering 
DEFPLs can also defer their loan repayments to the wholesalers that provided 
their funds, they may charge a lower nominal interest rate than that charged 
on the FRL, because the default risk profile of the borrower improves with the 
DEFPL. The borrower must, however, reimburse the lender for any 
accumulated interest or principal that is postponed during the term of the 
loan, plus a small additional fee. This reimbursement may be through the 
refinancing of the loan (Rose, 1989:483). Appendix 1, section 1.6 shows a two-
year DEFPL (DEFPL0-2) repayment schedule, where neither interest nor 
principal are repaid in the first two years of the R200,000 loan. From year 
three, the interest portion of the loan is fully capitalised using the simple 
compound interest formula (Lee et al, 1980:50): 
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 S = capitalised loan size (R242,000), s = initial loan size (R200,000), i = nominal 
annual interest rate of 10%, and n = two years.  
 
At the start of year three, the loan amount outstanding is (R200,000) (1.10)2, or 
R242,000. The nominal total annual repayments are calculated using equation 
(1) as for the FRL in section 3.1, on the R240,000 loan for 18 years, and equal 
R29,507. The interest portion and principal payments are calculated in the 
same way as for the FRL. The present value of the loan is the same for the 
lender, whether or not a deferred or conventional loan scheme is utilized, with 
the only difference being a shift in the cash-flow problem from the borrower to 
the lender (or to the wholesaler if the lender can defer repayments on the 
funds that it sources). The DEFPL0-2 would require total nominal and real 
repayments of R531,128 and R345,358 respectively, over the 20 years (real 
payments again calculated by the same method as the FRL).  
 
In SA, the Land Reform Empowerment Facility (LREF) was established in 
1999 as a wholesale lending facility that offers DEFPLs (and hence shifts the 
cash-flow problem from the client to the LREF, rather than to the 
intermediary) to commercial banks and credit-rated investors, who wish to 
finance land and farm-worker equity-share schemes (ESSs). The LREF 
charges, and bears the costs of, a lower interest rate than would be charged on 
a FRL, with the discount (between one to three percentage points below the 
three-month Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate (Jibar)) depending on the 
empowerment content of the end-borrower (Khula Enterprise Finance 
Limited, 2003). The facility is funded primarily by the Department of Land 
Affairs (DLA) and the European Union (EU) (through the DLA) and is, 
therefore, dedicated to financing land and farm-worker equity share schemes 
including pack sheds and wineries.  ABSA Bank is currently the main 
commercial bank in SA that is involved with the LREF. Experiences with this 
loan product in SA are discussed in section 5.  
 
4.6  Summary of the alternative loan products 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the differences in the time patterns of the annual series of 
nominal loan repayments for the R200,000 loan repaid over 20 years at a 
nominal annual interest rate of 10% for the FRL compared to the SPL, DP, 
PPL, 17YRGPL, 6YRGPL and DEFPL0-2. The SPL has smaller initial 
repayments (R20,000 versus R23,492) that ease liquidity stress in the early 
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years after asset purchase, but requires a nominal balloon repayment of both 
interest and principal in year twenty of R220,000. The SPL is also the most 
costly loan, with total nominal and real repayments that are R130,162 and 















































Note: FRL = fixed repayment loan; SPL = single payment non-amortized loan; DP = decreasing payment 
loan; PPL = partial payment loan; 17YRGPL = seventeen-year graduated payment loan; 6YRGPL = 
six-year graduated payment loan; and DEFPL0-2 = two-year deferred payment loan. 
 
Figure  1: Time patterns of the nominal annual repayments for the 
conventional loan versus five alternative variable payment loans 
(all loan terms for a R200,000 loan principal repaid over 20 years 
at a nominal annual interest rate of 10%) 
 
The PPL has the lowest total nominal and real repayments, assuming that the 
borrower can make the nominal balloon repayment in year five of R202,173. If 
not, the ending balance of the loan in year four would have to be refinanced at 
current market interest rates. In this situation, the PPL uses very similar 
financing terms to that of the VRL already used in SA, and thus may not be a 
useful option to consider. Interest rates may have risen over the last four years 
of the loan, encouraging lenders to add a premium into the interest rate for 
the refinanced loan, which could worsen the liquidity position of the BEE 
enterprise. The DP requires higher initial nominal annual loan repayments 
(R6,508 more than the FRL) that do not ease the liquidity problem in the early 
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years of operation. The DP loan, however, has total nominal and real 
repayments that are R59,838 and R23,118 respectively, less than the FRL. 
 
A GPL with interest-rate subsidy seems to have the most potential to ease the 
borrower’s (BEE project’s) liquidity stress. The 17YRGPL to finance land had 
total nominal and real repayments that were R84,634 and R67,726 (after 
subsidy), respectively, less than the FRL. If the GPL was used to finance the 
purchase of machinery-type assets, then the 6YRGPL would have required 
total nominal and real repayments of R13,957 and R12,596 respectively, less 
than the FRL. Finally, the DEFPL0-2 loan required a total nominal repayment 
of R531,128 (R61,290 more than the FRL) and a total real repayment of 
R345,358 (R26,095 more than the FRL). Clearly, the GPL and DEFPL0-2 loan 
repayment schedules can partly resolve the liquidity problem in the early 
years (assuming no major income shocks), although the DEFPL0-2 plan 
requires higher total repayments than the FRL. The question remains whether 
lenders would be prepared to implement these two financing plans for BEE 
investments in productive assets, where the funds to finance the interest-rate 
subsidy and the deferment would be sourced,  and how the interest-rate 
subsidy would affect asset values. 
 
5.  EXPERIENCE WITH GRADUATED PAYMENT LOAN AND 
DEFERRED PAYMENT LOAN SCHEMES USED TO FINANCE BEE 
IN THE FARMLAND MARKET IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
5.1  GPLs used by Ithala to finance “medium-scale farmers” (MSFs) in 
KwaZulu-Natal  
 
Cash grants to finance land purchase in SA were proposed by the World Bank 
in 1993, based on Binswanger’s reasoning that poor people are unable to 
finance land with conventional mortgages, especially when the market value 
of land exceeds (what is claimed by some) to be its productive value (Lyne et 
al, 2000:2). Nieuwoudt and Vink (1995:514) argued that interest subsidies 
associated with GPLs make it easier for PDIs to finance land purchases due to 
the relatively high annual rates of inflation that were common in SA in the 
1990s. This was in line with Tweeten’s (1989) reasoning that higher inflation 
causes higher costs (higher nominal interest payments), but defers returns 
(higher expected future nominal incomes). Adams (1987:11) believes that 
countries that run fewer subsidy loan programmes have more efficient and 
equitable financial systems. Policymakers in SA are concerned that interest-
rate subsidies will be capitalised into higher values of land and other long-
term asset values. If the interest-rate subsidy for the GPL were finite and 
targeted at PDIs, it may create fewer distortions in capital markets (Lyne & 
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Darroch, 2003). Per rand of subsidy, the interest-rate subsidy is more effective 
at solving the cash-flow problem than are cash grants, but grants are still 
needed to finance  equity – especially for employees wanting to purchase 
s h a r e s  i n  E S S s  ( L y n e ,  1 9 9 5 : 1 7 ) .  P r i v ate-sector sugar millers working with 
Ithala in SA since 1996 have used the interest-rate subsidy approach, whereas 
the SA government has used only cash grants to finance land purchases by 
PDIs since 1994. 
Lyne and Darroch (2002:127) indicate that for the six-year GPL, Ithala reduced 
the nominal interest rate for entrants from 16.5% to 10% initially, increasing it 
each year at the then expected 10% annual inflation rate in SA over the first six 
years of the loan. The nominal interest rate thus rose from 10% to 11% in year 
two, and to 12.1% in year three and so on until years seven to 20 when the 
sugarcane farmers would pay the full 16.5%. These medium-scale farmers 
(MSFs) were highly indebted - most had to borrow up to 95% of the funds 
needed to acquire the land (Mashatola & Darroch, 2003:1) - so the liquidity 
problem was inevitable. The MSF financing plan has shown positive results as 
currently some 80% of the 107 farmers that have used the scheme have met 
their loan repayments. The amount outstanding is reported to be only 0.5% of 
the R94 million total value of loans issued (Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), 2003:141). Van den Heever as cited by Mashatola 
& Darroch (2003) attributes the absence of defaulters, despite very high 
leverage ratios, partly to the interest-rate subsidy. The low rate of default is 
surprising, given that the initial (subsidised) annual interest rate was 10%, 
compared to an expected annual current real (cash) return on farmland of 5%, 
and that these farmers must still repay loan principal. These borrowers 
probably used part of the annual return attributed to management and risk to 
help fund their loan repayments. Some loan rescheduling, client access to off-
farm income and no major income shocks to date have also helped them to 
meet their repayments (Mashatola & Darroch, 2003:1).  
The MSF programme can be criticised as being elitist, in that 107 relatively 
wealthy farmers have been financed at an average loan size of R878,036. 
However, the graduated payment principles could be adapted and applied to 
help PDIs to finance the acquisition of smaller, more affordable farms that are 
creditworthy, thereby exposing buyers to lower levels of leverage and less 
financial risk than in the MSF programme. This would be a more effective 
channel than cash grants alone for using taxpayer money and donor funds to 
promote asset-based BEE in SA. These principles could also be adapted to 
finance the purchase of other productive farm, agribusiness and non-farm 
assets such as machinery and equipment by BEE investors. 
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5.2  DEFPLs offered by the Land Reform Empowerment Facility (LREF) 
 
The maturity term of each DEFPL offered by the LREF, and the period of 
deferment, is determined by the projected cash flows of the enterprise and the 
level of risk that the intermediary bank is prepared to accept in each case. 
Together with the one to three percentage point discount below the three-
month Jibar, these terms have enabled commercial banks to help finance land-
based empowerment partnerships that would otherwise have been rejected 
because of the liquidity problem and related financing risks. The LREF’s 
deferred repayment loans thus ease liquidity problems faced by emerging 
black farmers and farm-worker equity share schemes when financing land 
and other long-term assets like orchards and pack sheds. The SA government 
provides cash grants to help PDI’s to finance farmland or equity in land-based 
enterprises, and offers larger grants to beneficiaries that can raise loans to 
complement their grants. 
 
Between 2000 and 2002, non-guaranteed commercial loans worth R50 million 
were approved for disbursement through commercial banks to 15 land-based 
empowerment enterprises (Zille & Lyne, 2002:7). These loans benefited 500 
new worker-shareholders with shareholdings varying between five and 70% 
of total equity. The average LREF loan size per new owner was R135,000, 
making this a relatively cost-effective empowerment instrument considering 
the costs of buying high quality land using an individual mortgage, and the 
problem of creditworthiness that confronts new entrepreneurs. To date, no 
loan defaults have been reported by any of the participating banks (Zille & 
Lyne, 2002:7). The LREF’s experience, together with a steady growth in loan 
enquiries for non-land BEE projects, suggests that the underlying loan concept 
could be extended beyond the land economy to creditworthy empowerment 
enterprises in other sectors.  
 
Commercial banks can set the nominal on-lending interest rate above the 
Jibar, but are required to carry 100% of the lending (credit) risk, thus ensuring 
careful screening and appraisal of all loan applications. This also ensures that 
grant money is not used to re-capitalise non-viable white-owned farms that 
are experiencing cash-flow problems. Borrowers prefer the shortest deferment 
period necessary to overcome their liquidity problem, as there is a trade-off 
with profitability – the longer the deferment, the lower is the net present value 
of the investment’s future income stream.  In practice, the commercial bank 
intermediaries usually charge an interest rate that is slightly below the market 
rate. Interest costs decline further when farm-workers are awarded Land 
Redistribution for Agriculture Development (LRAD) grants to capitalise their 
share in an ESS (FAO, 2003:35). The LRAD programme also acts as an 
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important partnership incentive for white farm-owners, because the equity 
injection improves the owners’ gearing ratios and thus improves their cash 
flow and risk profiles (Zille & Lyne, 2002:7). The LRAD grant ranges between 
R20,000 and R100,000, depending on the applicant’s contribution. For 
example, a minimum own contribution of R5,000 is required for applicants to 
access a R20,000 grant. The maximum grant of R100,000 can be accessed if the 
beneficiary makes a minimum contribution (of equity plus debt) of R400,000. 
However, banks usually require a debt-to-equity ratio of less than unity when 
financing agriculture (Barry et al, 1995), which places an implicit cap on the 
LRAD grants. Even under optimal conditions, where the lender is assured 
that the borrower will receive a grant, a prospective owner-operator would 
have to contribute R100,000 of his/her own equity (from savings and/or other 
asset sources), in order to qualify for a grant of R90,000, and thus a loan of 
R190,000. The implicit cap on LRAD grants is less generous when the outcome 
of a grant application is uncertain (Lyne 2001:23). 
 
The LREF was initially capitalised with R63 million, R32 million of which was 
granted by the DLA, and R29 million by the EU (Lyne, 2001:9). Lyne (2001) 
simulated a series of loans with deferments of between one and three years 
and showed that the LREF could afford to disperse about R15 million per 
annum without reducing the real value of the fund to a level where it would 
become unsustainable. The facility approved R32 million in loans by 2001, 
with applications for another R34 million pending its recapitalisation. Out of 
the R32 million, some R4.8 million financed loans to individual farmers, and 
R27.7 million financed long-term loans to ESSs. Knight et al (2003:2) reported 
that about 50 farm-worker ESSs had been established in SA, mostly in the 
Western Cape. In 2003, 14 new loans worth R51,285,000 were approved, with 
961 beneficiaries (526 male and 443 female), and the fund balance had risen to 
R124,337,507 with additional funds raised through the DLA, EU and the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (Khula Enterprise Finance 
Limited, 2003). This empowerment programme appears to be much less elitist 
than that currently offered by Ithala’s GPLs, and highlights the potential that 
financing asset growth can play in promoting BEE in SA. 
 
Zille & Lyne (2002:9) applied the experiences of the LREF with its deferred 
payment plans to design a BEE loan product to finance investments in 
property, fixed improvements, equipment, and other durable assets under 
liquidity stress. They assessed the effects of variations in the interest rate, the 
maturity of the loan, the loan repayment schedule and the prospect of adding 
grant-financed equity capital, to identify the extent to which such variations 
could decrease the borrower’s risk profile and thus enable loans to be made to 
PDIs. Using 20 loan variations on realistic enterprise cash-flow projections, 
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they showed that negative cash flows experienced using a conventional VRL 
could be overcome if a variation of the key loan features was applied. Higher 
interest rates reduced the borrower’s liquidity, while longer-term loans with a 
one-year deferred repayment and equity grant could help to alleviate financial 
stress. The deferred payment had the largest statistically significant influence 
on liquidity, followed by the loan term, the interest rate and the use of grant 
money to finance equity. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  AND  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This paper shows that graduated loan repayment plans (GPLs) and deferred 
loan payment plans (DEFPLs) can partly resolve the liquidity problem that 
BEE investments in productive  assets financed by conventional long-term 
loans are likely to face in the early years of operation in South Africa. A GPL 
scheme using interest-rate subsidies funded by private sector sugar millers 
has empowered 107 black commercial farmers to buy sugarcane farms in 
KwaZulu-Natal since 1996. Relatively high loan repayment rates for this 
scheme, despite very high leverage ratios, have also been promoted by some 
loan rescheduling, many clients having access to off-farm income, and the 
absence of any major income shocks to date. It has also required substantial 
private sector funding (of interest-rate subsidies) when compared to the other 
loan products discussed in this paper. The concept of graduated loan 
repayments can readily be applied to finance non-land asset investments that 
are characterized by liquidity stress in the early years, and would probably 
relieve financial stress relatively more effectively for other crop enterprises 
with less regular cash flows than sugarcane, such as maize or orchard 
investments.  
 
The DEFPLs require higher total repayments than the conventional loans, but 
lenders would be reluctant to offer such loans unless they could finance the 
deferments. The Land Reform Empowerment Facility (LREF) is a wholesaler 
of funds that offers a loan product for this purpose in South Africa. The LREF 
has started to bridge the gap between the formal banking sector and new 
land-based BEE asset purchases by shifting the cash-flow problem away from 
the client to the LREF, rather than the intermediary. This aspect of the DEFPL 
resembles the KwaZulu-Natal GPL in the sense that the private sector millers, 
rather than the clients, bore the liquidity stress (by financing the interest-rate 
subsidies). The LREF’s deferred financing terms mean that commercial banks, 
in return for a restructuring of the end-borrowers’ ownership, can finance 
profitable agribusiness investments that are usually characterised by a 
temporary liquidity problem.  
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The lesson for policymakers from these experiences is that broad-based BEE 
could be promoted in other farm and non-farm sectors in South Africa using 
similar innovative loan products to leverage current cash grant funds via 
financial intermediaries. Bearing in mind the limitations of the GPL and 
DEFPL - in particular, where the funds to finance the interest-rate subsidy and 
the deferment would be sourced, and the impact of income shocks - this could 
be a constructive way to access private sector funds, donor funds and the NEF 
funds that have been set aside for BEE investments. Donor and NEF funds 
may be used to allocate grants to provide PDIs with own equity, and also to 
fund interest-rate subsidies via GPLs, or to fund DEFPLs (all LREF loans have 
been helped by a cash grant component). This could create an incentive for 
public/private partnerships, as public/donor funds could be then used to 
attract private sector loans to finance productive assets purchased by broad-
based BEE enterprises that satisfy defined empowerment criteria. Further 
research is needed to test the liquidity effects of GPLs and DEFPLs relative to 
conventional VRLs using data taken from applications made by different 
types of BEE enterprises to commercial banks for term loans to finance a 
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